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The New International Economic
Order and the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States
I. Background to the Sixth Special Session
of the U.N. General Assembly
To "permanent sovereignty" watchers the adoption by the United Nations
General Assembly in December 1974 of the Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States hardly came as a surprise. The more radical members of the
third world had long regarded the nationalization of natural resource rights as a
prerequisite to economic development and had presented this as a major issue in
their relations with developed countries. Thus, the Economic Declaration of
the Algiers Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in September 1973 included
the following:
The Conference gives its unreserved support to the application of the principle that
nationalization carried out by States as an expression of their sovereignty, in order to
safeguard their natural resources, implies that each State is entitled to determine the
amount of possible compensation and its mode of payment and that any disputes which
might arise should be settled in accordance with the national legislation of each
State....
The results obtained in the hydrocarbons sector, which was previously exploited for
the sole benefit of the transnational oil companies, demonstrate the power and
effectiveness of organized and concerted action by producing and exporting countries.
Similarly, the determination of an increasing number of developing countries to
terminate treaties, agreements and conventions imposed on them by force . . . is
producing increasingly positive results. This process should be extended, accelerated
and co-ordinated in Latin America, Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and in other
developing countries, in order to strengthen solidarity among the developing countries,
reverse the trend towards a deterioration of their situation and secure the establishment
of a new international economic order which would meet the requirements of genuine
democracy.
2
The Algiers Conference was attended by more than one hundred countries,
liberation movements, and international organizations, representing, as the
Declaration asserted, more than half the member States of the international
community and a majority of the world's population.' It was not surprising,
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therefore, that the General Assembly in the following December readily adopted
a Resolution affirming by a vote of 108 to 1 (United Kingdom), with 16
abstentions, that:
[T]he application of the principle of nationalization carried out by States, as an
expression of their sovereignty in order to safeguard their natural resources, implies
that each State is entitled to determine the amount of possible compensation and the
mode of payment, and that any disputes which might arise should be settled in
accordance with the national legislation of each State carrying out such ieasures; ...
The Algiers Declaration covered many other matters besides the
nationalization of natural resources rights. It included food, trade and
monetary problems; the transfer of technology; transnational companies; the
environment; and the perennial "struggle against imperialism." The principal
concern of this Note, however, is with the aggressive efforts being made to
socialize all activities related to natural resources and to weaken the protection
provided by international law to foreign private investment.
II. Action Taken at the Sixth Special Session
Having effectively established its leadership of the "non-aligned countries," it
was appropriate that Algeria's President Boumedienne should make the
opening speech at the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations General
Assembly' at which the Declaration on the Establishment of a New Interna-
tional Economic Order and the Programme of Action on such establishment
were adopted without vote. After pointing out that the central issues between
developed and developing countries are "the allocation of world resources" and
the need for "a profound reorganization of economic relations between rich and
poor countries," he stressed the continued dominance of the "colonialist and
imperial powers" and the extension of colonialism in merely another form.
Liberation from such dominance, he said, was essential for all developing
countries:
The will to gain and cling to their position of dominance over world resources has been
the guiding principle in the behaviour of the major imperialist Powers of the world.
Under multifarious guises the colonialist and neocolonialist phenomenon has at all
times revolved about the issue of the appropriation of world resources by the stronger
to the detriment of the weaker.
In fact, the colonialist and imperialist Powers accepted the principle of the right of
peoples to self-determination only when they had already succeeded in setting up the
institutions and machinery that would perpetuate the system of pillage established in
the colonial era.
... they have been able to proceed at will in fixing the prices of both the raw
materials they take from the developing countries and the goods and services with which
U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., A/RES/3171 (XXVIII), 1 3, adopted 17 Dec. 1973.
'U.N. GAOR. 6th Special Sess., prov. verbatim rec. A/PV.2208 (10 April 1974), at 2.
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they furnish those countries. Consequently, they are in a position to drain the resources
of the third world through a multiplicity of channels to their own advantage.
That is the basis of the economic order of the world in which we live today. In the eyes
of the vast majority of humanity it is an order as unjust and as outdated as the colonial
order to which it owes its origin and substance. Inasmuch as it is maintained and
consolidated and, therefore, thrives by virtue of a process which continually
impoverishes the poor and enriches the rich, this economic order constitutes the major
obstacle standing in the way of any hope of development and progress for all the
countries of the third world. 6
In the case of Algeria, he said, political liberation was followed by the
nationalization of its natural resource industries:
Thus my country took a certain number of steps: for example, the nationalization of
the mining industry, the nationalization of land, taking over all means of production in
the basic sectors of the national economy, . . .instituting State control over the
petroleum industry and, in particular, subjecting the fixing of oil and gas prices to the
exclusive authority of the State.
All those measures, working hand in hand with the democratization of education and
the transformation of social and economic structures in rural areas, led to the creation of
a type of production relationship and the gradual mobilization of the country's full
capacity with a view to accelerating the process of development, in harmony with a scale
of values in which the economy is a means and social and cultural progress are an end,
for every citizen.,
For all of the third world, he continued, it was essential not to lose sight of the
fact that:
...the effort to bring the task of recovery to fruition will remain without effect so
long as international monopolies and multinational corporations, those past masters at
the art of making concessions in order to safeguard the essentials, continue to control
the multiple mechanisms whereby the wealth of the poor countries is transferred away
from them, and mainly the system of price fixing for raw materials....
This battle, the latest manifestation of the ongoing confrontation between the
dialectic of domination and plundering on the one hand, and the dialectic of
emancipation and recovery on the other, revolves around the same ultimate stakes: the
control and use of the fruits of resources belonging to the countries of the third world.,
After praising the action taken by the OPEC countries, he stressed the need for
all producing countries "to control the levers of price control" and to realize
"the great possibilities of a union of the raw-materials-producing countries" so
as "to extend what has been achieved by the oil-producing countries ...to
include all the basic raw materials produced by the developing countries."'
Nevertheless, he continued, experience has shown that recognizing and pro-
claiming the right to nationalize are not enough. In view of the aggressive
behavior of private interests and the hostile attitudes of certain governments, he
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emphasized the duty of the United Nations to ensure that the right to
nationalize "does not remain merely theoretical" and that it "can be effectively
exercised by the countries of the third world," adding:
To this end the United Nations should be entrusted with the task of guaranteeing, to
such developing countries as may be led to nationalize, all the operational aid with
regard to operating and marketing that these countries might need. This Assembly
should condemn all those, be they Governments or enterprises, who use force or
economic power in order to perpetuate this new form of economic aggression which
consists of trying to destroy, curtail or discourage the effective exercise of the sovereign
right to nationalize. 10
These exhortations to the countries of the third world to nationalize natural
resources rights were, at the end of the Special Session, enshrined in a
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order,
paragraph 4 of which includes the following:
4. The new international economic order should be founded on full respect for the
following principles: ...
(e) Full permanent sovereignty of every State over its natural resources and all
economic activities. In order to safeguard these resources, each State is entitled to
exercise effective control over them and their exploitation with means suitable to its
own situation, including the right to nationalization or transfer of ownership to its
nationals, this right being an expression of the full permanent sovereignty of the
State. No State may be subjected to economic, political or any other type of coercion
to prevent the free and full exercise of this inalienable right; ...
The following provisions of the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a
New International Economic Order are also relevant:
I. Raw materials
All efforts should be made:
(a) To put an end to all forms of foreign occupation, racial discrimination,
apartheid, colonial, neo-colonial and alien domination and exploitation through the
exercise of permanent sovereignty over natural resources;
(b) To take measures for the recovery, exploitation, development, marketing, and
distribution of natural resources, particularly of developing countries. ...
VIII. Assistance in the exercise of permanent
sovereignty of States over natural resources
All efforts should be made:
(a)To defeat attempts to prevent the free and effective exercise of the rights of every
State to full and permanent sovereignty over its natural resources;
(b) To ensure that competent agencies of the United Nations system meet requests for
assistance from developing countries in connection with the operation of nationalized
means of production."
Although the New International Economic Order may also be largely
concerned with the development of trade, the removal of tariff and other
'
0Id. at 28-30.
"U-R"-..OTAR, 6th Special Sess., A/RES/3201 (S-VI), adopted 1 May 1974.
"U.N. GAOR, 6th Special Sess., A/RES/3202 (S-VI), at 3, 13.
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barriers, monetary problems, the indexation of raw materials prices, and the
stabilization of production and prices of raw materials, the foregoing are major
parts of the program and may be expected to dominate its development.
m[. The Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties of States
This movement for a New International Economic Order was developed in
parallel with work on a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. The
Programme of Action of the former, adopted in May, 1974, gave recognition to
the latter as:
. ..an effective instrument towards the establishment of a new system of international
economic relations based on equity, sovereign equality, and interdependence of the
interests of developed and developing countries. It is therefore of vital importance that
the aforementioned Charter be adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth
session.'"
The Charter had been earlier promoted on the initiative of Mexico. At the
Third UNCTAD in Santiago, Chile, in 1972, President Echeverria had called
for an instrument which would define and protect the economic rights of all
countries, particularly the developing ones. This proposal having been
endorsed by the Conference, a Working Group was named to prepare a draft
Charter based on the principles approved by UNCTAD in the Final Act of its
first session, plus suggestions made at the Third Session.'
The legal character of this proposal was emphasized by the Chairman of the
Working Group, Mexico's distinguished international lawyer, Ambassador
CastaTieda. According to the Report of the first session of the Working Group in
February, 1973, he then said that its function was "to formulate an
instrument. . . setting out genuine authentic rights and duties of a juridical
nature arising in economic relations between States"; many of the developing
countries stated that the proposed Charter "should be a legally binding
instrument"; both Chile and Mexico "expressed the view that the Working
Group's mandate ... was to draft a legally binding instrument"; representa-
tives of developed countries, however, doubted "the advisability, possibility or
feasibility of making the rights and duties formulated in a draft charter legally
binding on States.'"
When the draft charter prepared by the Working Group was introduced by
Ambassador Castaneda at the twenty-ninth regular session of the United
"Id. at 11.
"'Vanzant, Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of States: A Solution to the Development Aid
Problem?, 4 GA. J. INT'L L. 441, 450 (1974).
'"UNCTADOR. TD/B/AC.12/1 (6 March 1973), at 4-6; Brower and Tepe, The Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States: A Reflection or Rejection of International Law?, 9 INT'L L.
295, 297, 300 (1975).
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Nations General Assembly on November 25, 1974, he said that the Working
Group:
S.. had understood that its task was not only to codify the rules already embodied in
international law, but to make progress-in other words, to establish new rules to meet
the current and future needs of international society.
In comparing the Charter to the Declaration of the New International
Economic Order adopted in April, 1974, he added:
The resolutions of the sixth special session expressed aspirations and made
recommendations to the United Nations and certain groups of States. The draft
Charter, however, set down rights and duties; in other words, it was intended to govern
relations between States by establishing an objective and universal order. That was why,
in his view, the Charter should be the focal point of the interests and aspirations of the
various groups of States which formed the international community.
Finally, in an attempt to characterize as law what clearly would not be law, he
said that:
... all States clearly had a political duty to support and implement a legal universal
order, such as that embodied in the draft Charter, which protected and helped the most
vulnerable sector of the international community.
The principles of mutual solidarity and collective responsibility should be more
clearly and formally embodied in law. That, of course, was how the developing countries
saw the problem. But he firmly believed that it would also be in the interests of the
developed countries. The solidarity demanded by the developing countries was the
guarantee of peace and stability. The ever-widening gap between rich and poor
countries and, above all, the growing realization that the poverty of some created the
wealth of others could only generate an unstable international situation. 6
During the ensuing discussion in the General Assembly on the proposed
Charter, the Australian representative correctly stated that, while the Charter
"might have a significant effect on the development of international economic
law," it "could not itself create law." 17 This was strongly affirmed by the United
Kingdom representative. His government, he said, had decided to vote against
the draft Charter as a whole partly because many of its provisions "were
couched in terms appropriate to a legislative document and were designed to
impose far-reaching obligations of a long term character on developed
countries.""' No doubt this concern resulted not only from the strong efforts
made in the Working Group to formulate legal norms but also from such
statements as that made by the representative of Argentina in the General
Assembly when he referred to the Charter as "an instrument of economic inter-
national law." 19
16U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., prov. summ. rec., A/C.2/SR.1638, at 8, 9; Brower and Tepe, op. cit.
supra, at 300, 301.
"U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., prov. summ. rec., A/C.2/SR.1650, at 6.
"Id. at 16.
"U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., prov. verbatim rec., A/PV.2315 (12 Dec. 1974), at 12.
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Whatever the initial objectives of this exercise may have been, the six negative
votes cast against the Charter as a whole and the many negative votes cast
against many separate provisions clearly establish that it cannot have legal pre-
tensions. 2 0 General Assembly Resolutions do not in any way have the force of
law. Under the United Nations Charter the General Assembly may discuss and
make recommendations, but it is not a lawmaking body and its Resolutions, no
matter how solemnly expressed or characterized, nor how often repeated, do not
make law or have binding effect."1
A. Provisions Relating to Foreign Investment
and Transnational Corporations
No attempt will be made here to deal with the Charter as a whole. Its
provisions range from an endorsement of cooperation "for the promotion of
economic and social progress throughout the world," to a condemnation of
"colonialism, apartheid, racial discrimination, neo-colonialism, and all forms
of foreign aggression, occupation and domination" (States which practice these
"coercive policies" being "economically responsible" for full restitution and for
damages); from the endorsement of tariff preferences for developing countries
to a requirement that the prices for exports from developing countries be
adjusted according to the prices of their imports; from "the right to associate in
organizations of primary commodity producers" (raw material cartels) to the
assertion of a duty to promote the transfer of technology to developing
countries; and from the liberalization of trade, the dismantling of obstacles and
better terms for less developed country exports, to the regulation of foreign
investment, control over multinationals and the expropriation of foreign
property.
The following analysis deals mainly with the last mentioned category. The
provisions of the Charter on these subjects are embodied in Article 2 which
reads as follows:
Article2
1. Every State has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, including
possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth, natural resources and economic
activities.
2. Each State has the right:
(a) To regulate and exercise authority over foreign investment within its national
jurisdiction in accordance with its laws and regulations and in conformity with
its national objectives and priorities. No State shall be compelled to grant
preferential treatment to foreign investment;
2cThe final vote on the Charter as a whole was 120 in favor, 6 against (Belgium, Denmark, Fed.
Rep. of Germany, Luxembourg, United Kingdom and United States), and 10 abstentions (Austria,
Canada, France, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Netherlands, Norway and Spain), U.N. GAOR, 29th
Sess., prov. verbatim rec., A/PV.2315 (12 Dec. 1975), at 43-45.
"Cf. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1973), at 14; Brower and
Tepe, op. cit. supra, at 301, 302.
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(b) To regulate and supervise the activities of transnational corporations within
its national jurisdiction and take measures to ensure that such activities
comply with its laws, rules and regulations and conform with its economic
and social policies. Transnational corporations shall not intervene in the
internal affairs of a host State. Every State should, with full regard for its
sovereign rights, co-operate with other States in the exercise of the right set
forth in this subparagraph;
(c) To nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, in which
case appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting such
measures, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circum-
stances that the State considers pertinent. In any case where the question of
compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic
law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals, unless it is freely and
mutually agreed by all States concerned that other peaceful means be sought
on the basis of the sovereign equality of States and in accordance with the
principle of free choice of means. 22
It will be noted that paragraph 1, dealing with "full permanent sovereignty"
now covers not only all of a State's "natural resources" and all of its "wealth"
but also all of its "economic activities." Presumably the intention is to cover in
the last category not only the activities of the State itself but also all economic
activities which fall under its jurisdiction. It could be argued, perhaps, that the
emphasis placed on "its" activities leaves untouched those of non-State parties.
It is hardly conceivable, however, that this was the intention.
As for paragraph 2, the first point to make is that the three subparagraphs
omit any provision for the observance of contracts. This omission is significant.
While it would have been appropriate and perhaps beneficial to have had an
affirmation of the binding character of agreements between States and foreign
private parties, it should be noted that the developing countries refrained from
incorporating a provision that such agreements shall not be binding. Strenuous
efforts were made to include a provision for the recognition of contract
obligations. The subject proved to be the main stumbling block in the intense
diplomatic efforts to achieve a consensus on the document.
There were, however, other basic difficulties which are discussed below.
These included insistence on the application of municipal law to the
expropriation of foreign-owned property to the exclusion of international law,
the latitude allowed the taking State to determine what compensation, if any,
would be "appropriate," and the denial of any right to an international
standard different from the standard applied to nationals.
As will be noted, it is clear that many developing countries are not in accord
with the radical views expressed by the more militant members of the third world.
Although the votes on all issues were overwhelmingly against the developed
countries, and while the solidarity of the Group of 77 is still impressive, the
22A/RES/3281(XXIX), supra note 1, at 5; Brower and Tepe, op. cit. supra, note 15, at 304-309.
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representatives of many developing countries went out of their way to state that
they are themselves prepared to treat foreign investment fairly and to live up to
their contracts.
B. State Obligations to Private Persons
The situation with respect to this issue was described by the Chairman of the
Working Party in the following terms when he introduced the Report of the
Working Party:
The chief stumbling-block had been the issue of investment agreements. The Group of
77 had maintained that a clear distinction should be made between agreements between
States and those concluded between a State and a private company ... the Group B
countries considered that, if a State accepted foreign capital under certain conditions
and concluded an agreement with the investing company, that agreement should be
fulfilled in good faith. The countries of the Group of 77 did not deny the general duty of
all States to fulfill their obligations, but considered that such agreements were not inter-
national agreements, since they were not concluded between States and were therefore
governed by the domestic law of the State concerned. They did not have international
status because private companies were not subjects of international law. 3
Disagreement on the question of "making the legal bond between the company
and the State a bond of international law" was, he said, "radical."
This had also been one of the basic issues before the General Assembly in 1962
when it adopted Resolution 1803 (XVII) on the subject of Permanent Sovereignty
over Natural Resources. In the debates on the draft resolution then proposed by
Chile, Ambassador Klutznick, representing the United States, had proposed an
amendment providing that "agreements freely entered into by sovereign States
shall be faithfully observed," pointing out that there was no compulsion on States
to deal with other States or with private companies, but it was "an attribute of its
sovereignty" to decide whether or not to do so and the resolution should not create
unnecessary difficulties for the State that decides to contract. 24 Iraq had opposed
the amendment, insisting that private companies were "adaquately protected by
the national legislation of sovereign States, and it was therefore unnecessary to
stress the need for their observance in an international investment. '25 Lebanon
and Syria proposed that the United States proposal be amended by substituting
"between" for "by," so that it would refer to "agreements freely entered into
between sovereign States." Chile, however, opposed this and the issue came to a
vote on the choice between an amended United States proposal to refer to
agreements freely entered into "by or between" sovereign States and the
alternative limited to "between." 26
Among the 47 countries voting with the United States and other developed
countries in December 1962 were 24 developing countries as compared with 16
"U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., prov. summ. rec. A/C.2/SR.1639, at 4, 5.
24U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., 2d Cee., 835th, 845th, 850th meetings (Nov. 1%2).
251d. 855th meeting (29 Nov. 1%2).
"Id. 857th meeting (3 Dec. 1%2).
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developing countries that supported the Soviet bloc in casting 33 votes in favor of
the Lebanon/Syria alternative. 7 In the plenary session on December 14, 1962, a
request by Burma for a separate vote on the provision in paragraph 9 of the
Resolution which reads, "Foreign investment agreements freely entered into by
or between sovereign States shall be observed in good faith . . ." was rejected 45
to 22, with 24 abstentions. The Resolution as a whole was adopted by a vote of 87
to 2, with 12 abstentions.28
Twelve years later, with more than thirty additional countries in the United
Nations, a proposal by 14 developed countries to include in the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States a provision that States taking measures in
the exercise of their right to nationalize foreign property "shall fulfill in good faith
their international obligations" was defeated by a vote of only 20 in favor, 71
against and 18 abstentions . 2 After this exclusion, the remainder of a proposed
alternative Article 2 of Chapter II, which would have included a provision that
each State has the right:
(b) To enter freely into undertakings relating to the import of foreign capital which shall
be observed in good faith;
was defeated by a vote of only 19 in favor, 87 against and 11 abstentions.30
That these votes did not necessarily reflect the views of all developing countries,
however, is apparent from the 18 abstentions in the first vote and from the
statement in explanation of vote made by Afghanistan, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan,
Kuwait, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.31 Nevertheless, the record is a
dismal one as regards the stability of contracts between governments and foreign
investors. It is understood that the compromise text sponsored by H. L. Brillantes
of the Philippines, which included a provision that "undertakings relating to the
import of foreign capital ... shall be observed in good faith," 3 was generally
accepted in the informal negotiations in New York before the Group of 77 text
was submitted to the General Assembly. At the very last moment, however, it was
rejected, mainly on the insistence of Algeria and Iraq, on the ground that any
commitment with respect to investment contracts with private companies was
completely unacceptable. So forceful is the present influence of the radical
element in the Group of 77 that positive international law protection for such
"Id. 858th meeting (3 Dec. 1962).
"4U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., prov. verbatim rec. A/PV.1194 (14 Dec. 1962).
"U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., A/C.2/L.1404; prov: summ. rec. A/C.2/SR.1648, at 2, 3. Those
abstaining included Afghanistan, Bardados, Cyprus, Gabon, Haiti, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan,
Kuwait, Liberia, Malawi, Malta, Swaziland and Thailand.
"Id. at 3, 4.
3 U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., prov. summ. rec. A/C.2/SR. 1650, at 18 (Afghanistan); SR. 1649, at 20,
21 (Indonesia); SR. 1650, at 10, 11 (Iran); id. at 12, 13(Jordan); SR. 1642, at 9 (Kuwait); A/PV.2316,
at 6 (Malaysia); A/C.2/SR.1650, at 17, 18 (Singapore); A/PV.2315, at 46, 47 (Thailand).
32UNCTADOR, TD/B/AC.124, at 8 (Alternative 2, 1 (1)(6)).
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contracts thus appears to be presently non-negotiable with the Group of 77.
While it does not follow from this that governments will not observe their under-
takings or that such contracts are not governed by international law and the
Charter as noted above, refrains from denying that such contracts are so
governed, it must be recognized that, where governments do not observe their
commitments to foreign investors, appeals to international law will have to meet
the argument that these propositions are no longer accepted by a significant
segment of the international community.
C. Law Applicable to Nationalizations
A second major difference with the developed countries (referred to as Group B
countries) related to the applicability generally on international law. Primafacie,
the law governing a nationalization would be the law of the nation taking such
action. As the Chairman of the Working Party said in his introductory remarks:
The Group B countries maintained that, while the domestic law of each country played a
decisive role, if the solution imposed by that law in the setting of compensation did not
satisfy certain international standards, international law should be applicable. In that
context, they understood international law to include generally accepted practice as well
as bilateral or multilateral agreements concluded by the expropriating country. 3
On the other hand, the developing countries denied the applicability of
international law as well as the existence of rules governing the payment and
amount of compensation. Mexico's Rabasa expressed surprise that there were
still those ("the economically privileged few") who questioned or opposed "the
free use and disposition of natural resources by those in whose territories those
resources are found.". This, he considered, "an alarming symptom of neo-
colonialism."
No one denied the value of and need for foreign investments, he said, but the
great majority opposed interference in the economic and political conduct of a
country. As regards nationalization and expropriation, it was appropriate, he
stressed, that:
... the State should undertake to pay appropriate compensation. That is such an
important principle for Mexico that we have inscribed it in our Constitution and our
laws. But, as the charter says, if any dispute arises it should be settled in accordance with
the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals; that is, it should be
internal legal order which establishes the procedures and means of compensation. What
is not to be tolerated, and what the overwhelming majority of countries have therefore
completely rejected, is that instead of or in addition to the national legal system, other
bodies or extra-national procedures should be called on to rule on what a State should do
in such cases. To accept such a system as binding would be to place States on an equal
legal and political footing with foreign corporations, and that would mean that those
corporations would receive nothing more or less than the treatment which should be
reserved solely for States. 3'
"3U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., prov. summ. rec. A/C.2/SR.1638, at 5.
34U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., prov. verbatim rec. A/PV.2315(12 Dec. 1974), at 71-75.
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A more extreme statement was made by Iraq:
It is only by nationalization and the liquidation of concessionary systems and all colonial
forms of exploitation that developing countries can use freely and efficiently those
resources for the benefit of their people in fulfilling the objective of their accelerated
social and economic development. Our understanding of that principle is that all
questions and consequences arising from the exercise of the right to permanent
sovereignty over natural resources are to be governed solely by the State concerned, its
competent organs, institutions and laws. 35
D. Payment of Appropriate Compensation
As proposed by the Group of 77, the compensation payable in the event of
-nationalization, expropriation or other transfer of "ownership of foreign
property" would be "appropriate . . . provided that all relevant circumstances
call for it." 3 6 The amendment proposed by the developed countries, which
included a paragraph providing for the payment of "just compensation in the
light of all relevant circumstances," was defeated by a vote of 19 in favor, 87
against, with 11 abstentions. The abstentions included Cyprus, Ivory Coast,
Jordan, Kuwait, Malta, Qatar and Turkey.37
A separate vote on paragraph 2(c) of Article 2 of the Charter, providing for
''appropriate compensation . . . provided all relevant circumstances call for it"
and for the settlement of controversies over compensation "under the domestic
law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals" unless otherwise agreed, was
decided by a vote of 104 in favor, 16 against, and only 6 abstentions, Barbados
being the only developing country to abstain."1
Several such countries, however, explained their positions as regards their
votes in favor of paragraph 2(c). Thus, Fiji did not participate in the vote on
Article 2(c) "because it felt that it would be more desirable if reference in that
subparagraph were also made to some equitable principle such as the generally
accepted rules of international law, in connection with controversies arising with
respect to adequate compensation in cases of nationalization"; Indonesia
understood that the formulation gave States "a certain flexibility, if necessary, to
seek the settlement of disputes arising out of nationalization and compensation
by peaceful means otherwise than through national tribunals"; Iran understood
Article 2(c) to be "without prejudice to any arrangements or agreements reached
between States concerning investments and the modalities of compensation in the
event of nationalization or expropriation of foreign property"; Jordan "had not
participated in the vote on paragraph 2(c)" adding that, while it was "the
sovereign right of every State to nationalize foreign property if legitimate
circumstances so required, the rights of foreign investors should be adequately
"U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., prov. verbatim rec. A/PV.2316 (12 Dec. 1974), at 23-25.
3 U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., 2nd Cee., A/C.2/L.1386 (21 Nov. 1974), at 5.
"U.N. GAOR. 29th Sess., prov. summ. rec. A/C.2/SR.1648, at 3, 4.
"Id. at 41, 42.
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guaranteed in accordance with international law"; Kuwait was "not at ease with
the formulation of Article 2 concerning the role of local tribunals in the settlement
of disputes over the nature of compensation"; Malaysia said that it had "an
active policy of wooing foreign investment" and that its vote in favor of 2(c)
"should not be considered as a departure from our policy on foreign investment
and our commitments"; Singapore "would continue to adhere to the provisions
of the International Convention on the Settlement of Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States in its regulation of foreign investment and
multinational enterprises"; and Thailand said that its affirmative vote on 2(c)
should be understood in the light of its statement that it "will continue to respect
international agreements and the rules of international law," of its policy to foster
a favorable investment climate, and of prohibitions in its own laws against the
nationalization of "promoted foreign enterprises."3 9
No doubt many other developing countries shared these views and did not
intend to frighten investors by what Canada described as an effort "to establish
the principle that a State may nationalize or expropriate foreign property without
compensation-in effect, confiscate such property."' 40 Nevertheless, a solid
developing country bloc vote, combined with the Soviet bloc, of 104 in favor of
paragraph 2(c) must be reckoned by prospective investors as a strong challenge to
the very system of private enterprise that such investors are engaged in
promoting.
E. Applicability of a Minimum International Standard
According to the Chairman of the UNCTAD Working Party,
The developing countries had wanted to include in paragraph 2 a further principle to
which some Group B countries had objected. The principle was that contained in
alternative 1, paragraph (4), which stated that "no State whose nationals invest in a
foreign country shall demand privileged treatment for such investors." Some countries
and jurists maintained, of course, that the "minimum standard" concept existed in
international law and that an alien could receive more favourable treatment than the
nationals of a country. Naturally, that was rejected by the developing countries, which
invoked the principle of sovereign equality embodied in the United Nations Charter as
being incompatible with preferential treatment for aliens."
This unwillingness to accept the principle that foreign investors are entitled by
international law to, a minimum standard of fair treatment was clearly one of the
reasons why the United States, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Denmark,
Germany and Luxembourg felt compelled to vote against the Charter as a whole
and ten other developed countries abstained.
"FUi." A/PV.2315, at 13-15; Indonesia: A/C.2/SR.,1644, at 8, 9; Iran: A/C.2/SR.1650, at 11;
Jordan: A/C.2/SR.1650, at 12; Kuwait: A/C.2/SR.1642, at 9; Malaysia: A/PV.2315, at 6; Singapore:
A/C.2/SR.1650, at 18; Thailand: A/PV.2315, at 46, 47. _
'
0U.N. GOAR, 29th Sess., prov. verbatim rec. A/PV.2315, at 57.41U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., prov. summ. rec. A/C.2/SR.1638, at 6.
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IV. Conclusion
The predominant concern of developing countries is with their own economic
development. While ideology plays an important role in their relations with
developed countries and foreign private enterprises, immediate concerns are with
exports, the removal of trade barriers, the stabilization of raw material prices,
and the rapid acquisition and use of technology. Cooperation on the part of the
developed countries in these areas should mitigate substantially the heat and
venom of ideological tirades.
The third world movement for better economic conditions has grown
impressively in strength and cohesion during the last twenty-five years. As OPEC
has demonstrated, its claims can be given practical and devastating effect.
Although it is difficult to envision similar successes in respect of other raw
materials, it would nevertheless appear appropriate that investing countries
make positive moves to accommodate many of the demands of the third world in
order to prevent further impairment of the investment climate, discouragement
of capital and technology flows and further damage to the enormous capital
commitments already made in the third world.
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